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PROFESSOR KINGSFIELD IN CONFLICT:  
RHETORICAL CONSTRUCTIONS 
OF THE U.S. LAW PROFESSOR PERSONA(E) 
CARLO A. PEDRIOLI
*
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
At least since the 1960s, a “‘two cultures’ phenomenon” has become 
quite apparent within the legal field in the United States.
1
  On one hand, 
some lawyers, usually those within the university, have been more 
academically oriented, and, on the other hand, other lawyers, usually those 
in legal practice or sitting on the bench, have been more pragmatically 
oriented.  Problems arise when these two groups begin to talk differently 
from each other.
2
  In a way, the field of law has developed into at least two 
different legal professions,
3
 and, not surprisingly, scholars and practitioners 
have experienced tension because of this situation.
4
  The problem comes to 
a head when, through rhetoric,
5
 lawyers envision their ideal role(s) for the 
law professor. 
  
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Barry University.  B.A. (summa cum laude), Communication and 
English, California State University, Stanislaus, 1999; J.D., University of the Pacific, 2002; M.A., 
Communication, University of Utah, 2003; Ph.D., Communication, University of Utah, 2005.  The 
author is a member of the State Bar of California.  For insightful feedback on prior versions of this 
Article, the author thanks David J. Vergobbi of the University of Utah, Lisa Flores of the University of 
Colorado at Boulder, Wayne McCormack of the University of Utah, Tarla Rai Peterson of Texas A&M 
University, and Richard D. Rieke of the University of Utah.  The author dedicates this Article to Bobby 
Lee Gabell, friend and fellow student of higher education. 
 1. Harry H. Wellington, Challenges to Legal Education: The “Two Cultures” Phenomenon, 37 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 327, 327 (1987). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Robert Stevens, American Legal Scholarship: Structural Constraints and Intellectual Con-
ceptualism, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 442, 445 (1983).  
 4. Francis A. Allen, The Prospects of University Law Training, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 127, 131 
(1978).  In recommending that law schools should offer students more practical experience during the 
students’ study of law, the Carnegie Foundation has suggested that law schools are at least somewhat 
disconnected from the world of legal practice.  WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH 
WEGNER, LLOYD BOND, & LEE S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW (SUMMARY) 8-10 (2007).  See also David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law 
Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/business/after-
law-school-associates-learn-to-be-lawyers.html?pagewanted=all. 
 5. In general, the term rhetoric refers to communication, which itself refers to human symbol 
use. SONJA K. FOSS & KAREN A. FOSS, INVITING TRANSFORMATION: PRESENTATIONAL SPEAKING FOR A 
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The law professor is the central figure in the education of prospective 
lawyers, “the principal actor in the [law school] classroom.”6  In many 
cases, the law professor can represent students’ first encounters with the 
legal field and has the opportunity to make “a positive impact” on students.7  
Naturally, the law professor can make a negative impact on students, too.  
Either way, the law professor helps to shape the way students view the legal 
field because, when interacting with students, “the law professor . . . 
convey[s] a sense of what it means to be a lawyer.”8  
Within the legal profession, the law professor has “a profound impact 
on thinking about law, procedure, and institutions.”9  Today, because “[t]he 
American law professor is American legal education,”10 he or she is “both 
the gatekeeper[ ] and molder[ ] of the profession.”11  In 1927, Felix 
Frankfurter, then a law professor at Harvard University and a future justice 
on the U.S. Supreme Court, observed, “In the last analysis, the law is what 
the lawyers are.  And the law and the lawyers are what the law schools 
make them.”12  Given such “a tremendous influence” that the law professor 
has on the U.S. legal system,
13
 one might think of the law professor as a 
senior high priest among the high priests. 
In the mid-1980s, Douglas D. McFarland conducted research that 
sought to understand the images of U.S. law professors, both those images 
that law professors had of themselves and those images that practicing 
lawyers and law students had of law professors.  McFarland’s study 
  
CHANGING WORLD 4 (2003).  Various types of rhetoric are available to communicators.  For example, 
traditional rhetoric is based on persuasion.  In his fourth century B.C. treatise On Rhetoric, Aristotle saw 
rhetoric as “an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion.”  ARISTOTLE, 
ON RHETORIC:  A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 36 (George A. Kennedy trans., 1991).  Additionally, 
invitational rhetoric is based on dialogue.  Some feminist scholarship has suggested that rhetoric can be 
“an invitation to understanding as a means to create a relationship rooted in equality, immanent value, 
and self-determination.”  Sonja K. Foss & Cindy L. Griffin, Beyond Persuasion: A Proposal for an 
Invitational Rhetoric, 62 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 2, 5 (1995).  Moreover, cooperative rhetoric is based on 
problem-solving.  Contemporary scholarship has theorized that rhetoric can be “a process of reasoned 
interaction intended to help participants and audiences make the best assessments or the best decisions in 
any given situation.”  JOSINA M. MAKAU & DEBIAN L. MARTY, COOPERATIVE ARGUMENTATION:  A 
MODEL FOR DELIBERATIVE COMMUNITY 87 (2001) (emphasis omitted). 
 6. Robert J. Borthwick & Jordan R. Schau, Gatekeepers of the Profession: An Empirical Profile 
of the Nation’s Law Professors, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 191, 195 (1991). 
 7. Jason Ostrom, The Competing Roles of Law Professors, 42 S. TEX L. REV. 539, 540 (2001). 
 8. Id. 
 9. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 
1980S xiii (1983). 
 10. Douglas D. McFarland, Self-Images of Law Professors: Rethinking the Schism in Legal 
Education, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 232, 232 (1985) [hereinafter McFarland, Rethinking the Schism].  
 11. Borthwick & Schau, supra note 6, at 193. 
 12. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profes-
sion, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992). 
 13. Eugene A. Gilmore, Some Criticisms of Legal Education, 7 A.B.A. J. 227, 230 (1921). 
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concluded that, at least throughout the years studied, lawyers could not 
agree whether the law professor should be more academic or practical in 
nature.
14
  McFarland observed that legal academics and practitioners had 
come to “live in different rhetorical worlds.”15  Specifically, these players in 
the legal field came to develop “little or no understanding” of each other 
and even became “hostile to one another.”16  Although each camp continued 
to disseminate its rhetoric, the other camp failed to process that rhetoric 
because the views of the camps were so different.
17
  Quite simply, the 
communication was not working well.
18
  Since this communication had not 
been moving forward, observers reasonably could expect nothing more than 
minor change, if that at all.
19
   
McFarland’s study addressed legal articles from the 1960s, 1970s, and 
early 1980s, but, as a function of the time in which the study took place, the 
research did not consider legal articles from the mid-1980s on.
20
  Although 
he expressed doubt about studying the past of the conflict over the law 
professor, McFarland explicitly suggested studying the law professor over 
time as a topic for future research.
21
  Also, McFarland conceded that 
essentially “[t]he discussion . . . should be read as descriptive rather than 
normative.”22  In other words, McFarland’s study offered no major 
suggestions for addressing the problem he identified.  Given the time that 
has passed since McFarland conducted his research, as well as the lack of a 
normative dimension to that research, further study of the role(s) of the law 
professor is appropriate and may lead to important new insights. 
Calling upon rhetorical theory, this Article traces the contours of the 
conflict over the construction of the role(s), or persona(e), of the U.S. law 
professor from 1960 to the present.  The Article draws an initial line at 1960 
because, by the 1960s, law schools in the United States had matured to the 
point at which they clearly were thinking of themselves as graduate 
programs within the university system.
23
  After a discussion of persona 
  
 14.  Douglas Dale McFarland Jr., Self-Images of Law Professors: Rethinking Legal Education 
230-31 (1983) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota) (on file with Wilson Library, 
University of Minnesota) [hereinafter McFarland, Rethinking Legal Education]. 
 15. Douglas D. McFarland, Students and Practicing Lawyers Identify The Ideal Law Professor, 
36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 93, 105 (1986) [hereinafter McFarland, Students and Practicing Lawyers].   
 16. Id. 
 17. McFarland, Rethinking the Schism, supra note 10, at 260.   
 18. McFarland, Students and Practicing Lawyers, supra note 15, at 106.   
 19. Id. at 106-07. 
 20. McFarland, Rethinking Legal Education, supra note 14, at 45.  
 21. Id. at 237. 
 22. Id. at 207. 
 23. Thomas F. Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself, 54 VA. L. REV. 637, 
649 (1968).  Today, U.S. legal education offers its graduates an advanced degree, the J.D.  Xu Wei, A 
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theory and persona analysis, this Article will address the two major 
personae that have emerged in the conflict, the law professor as scholar and 
the law professor as practitioner.  As appropriate, each subsection of the 
Article that considers a persona also will address the type of rhetoric that 
lawyers have employed in developing their preferred persona.  In this study, 
the term lawyers will refer to both practicing lawyers and academic lawyers.  
A concluding section will synthesize some of the communication problems 
that have emerged in this ongoing conflict, usually due to a heavy reliance 
on traditional Aristotelian rhetoric, or persuasion,
24
 as a rhetorical strategy.  
Although descriptive in nature, the current Article will set the stage for a 
subsequent article, normative in nature, that will open the door to an 
alternative approach to this ongoing conflict. 
II.  PERSONA THEORY AND PERSONA ANALYSIS 
This section of the Article addresses the theory and methodology for the 
study.  More specifically, the section calls upon rhetorical theory for a 
discussion of persona theory and persona analysis. 
A.  Persona Theory 
Persona theory considers the roles, or personae, that communicators, or 
rhetors, create in discourse.
25
  At least four types of personae can be present 
in discourse, including the first, second, third, and fourth personae.  This 
subsection of the Article will reference each persona, but, given the focus of 
the Article on the first persona, this subsection will concentrate on the first 
persona as opposed to the other personae.   
One can describe the first persona as “the constructed speaker/writer or 
‘I’ of discourse.”26  Such a persona is “‘the created personality put forth in 
the act of communicating’”27 and allows the rhetor to identify with the 
audience.
28
  In literature, the first persona is the speaker or character a writer 
  
Comparative Study of Environmental Law Clinics in the United States and China, 19 EDUC. & L.J. 75, 
78 (2009). 
 24. See supra, note 5.   
 25. Paaige K. Turner & Patricia Ryden, How George Bush Silenced Anita Hill: A Derridian View 
of the Third Persona in Public Argument, 37 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 86, 88 (2000). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Paul Newell Campbell, The Personae of Scientific Discourse, 61 Q. J. SPEECH 391, 394 
(1975) (emphasis omitted) (quoting WALKER GIBSON, PERSONA: A STYLE STUDY FOR READERS AND 
WRITERS xi (1969)). 
 28. Walter G. Kirkpatrick, Bolingbroke and the Opposition to Sir Robert Walpole: The Role of a 
Fictitious Persona in Creating an Audience, 32 CENT. STATES SPEECH. J. 12, 12 (1981). 
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creates in the course of crafting writing like poetry or fiction.
29
  In a way, a 
first persona is a rhetorical mask that the rhetor chooses to wear as he or she 
performs rhetorically, and because the persona at issue is a mask, the 
persona is not necessarily the rhetor himself or herself.
30
 
Several examples of first personae that rhetors have adopted will help 
illustrate these principles.  For instance, in 1916, Marcus Garvey, the then-
unknown leader of the new Universal Negro Improvement Association, 
faced the problem of leading members of an outsider racial group against 
social injustice.
31
  In part, Garvey met the challenge by assuming a Black 
Moses persona.
32
  In his rhetoric, Garvey relied upon subjects like election, 
captivity, and liberation, calling to mind Moses and the Jewish experiences 
from the Old Testament.
33
  While Garvey was not actually Moses, he did 
assume the Moses persona.  A more recent rhetor who adopted the Moses 
persona, among other personae, was Louis Farrakhan.  In his Million Man 
March speech, delivered on October 16, 1995, in Washington, D.C., 
Farrakhan attempted to enhance his credibility, or ethos, which had suffered 
due to Farrakhan’s prior inflammatory rhetoric, by assuming a prophetic 
persona, specifically that of Moses.
34
  In a related example, Martin Luther 
King, Jr., assumed in his rhetoric against civil rights violations the general 
persona of a prophet, although despite his skillful rhetoric King was not 
necessarily an actual prophet.
35
 
Regardless of which first persona or personae a rhetor assumes, the 
notion of the first persona comes from Greek and Roman theater and in 
Latin suggests the idea of a “mask” or a “false face.”36  In this theatrical 
context, the actor would put on a mask and assume the persona of the 
mask.
37
  Such a historical understanding gives rise to the notion that the 
persona is pre-existing and that the actor only needs to assume the role.
38
  
Much of the existing scholarship on persona theory takes for granted that an 
  
 29. Emory B. Elliott, Persona and Parody in Donne’s The Anniversaries, 58 Q. J. SPEECH 48, 49 
(1972); Campbell, supra note 27, at 391. 
 30. Thomas O. Sloan, The Persona As Rhetor: An Interpretation of Donne’s Satyre III, 51 Q. J. 
SPEECH. 14, 14, 26 (1965). 
 31. B. L. Ware & Wil A. Linkugel, The Rhetorical Persona: Marcus Garvey As Black Moses, 49 
COMM. MONOGRAPHS 50, 52-53 (1982). 
 32. Id. at 61. 
 33. Id. at 56-61. 
 34. John L. Pauley, Reshaping Public Persona and the Prophetic Ethos: Louis Farrakhan at the 
Million Man March, 62 W. J. COMM. 512, 512-14, 522-23 (1998). 
 35. Campbell, supra note 27, at 394.  
 36. Ware & Linkugel, supra note 31, at 50. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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advocate assumes a role from a selection of cultural archetypes, or original 
models or prototypes.
39
 
Despite what much previous scholarship suggests, not all personae need 
to be pre-existing.  For example, one might argue that Franklin Roosevelt 
and Winston Churchill created their own personae during the dark days of 
the Great Depression and World War II.  Rather than selecting from 
previously existing personae they might adopt, the two leaders created their 
own distinct personae.
40
  Later leaders could call upon the Roosevelt and 
Churchill personae for rhetorical effectiveness.  Thus, it is important to note 
that some rhetors are able to create their own personae, which then can 
become part of a repository of available personae from which other rhetors 
can select. 
While in certain cases the two concepts of construction and 
performance of first personae can function together, distinguishing between 
two major types of first personae is necessary, as this Article will for its 
analysis.  On one hand, a rhetor can select and assume a persona in his or 
her communication.  The focus of study here is on the performance, so it is 
appropriate to think of this type of first persona as first persona performed 
(FPP).  On the other hand, as in the case of the construction of the role of 
the then-new U.S. president, the rhetor involved might create the persona, 
which the rhetor himself or herself or a different rhetor might employ in 
subsequent discourse.  The idea is the creation of a rhetorical tool for later 
implementation.  This additional type of first persona is a first persona 
constructed (FPC).  The theoretical distinction allows critics to focus more 
on either performance or construction of first personae.   
In addition to helping explain the personae advocates can adopt for 
themselves, persona theory also addresses the roles, as the rhetor constitutes 
them, that audiences play in the communication process.
41
  These roles that 
audiences play are the second, third, and fourth persona; respectively, the 
personae are idealized, marginalized, and collusive in nature.  They are 
mentioned here for theoretical context only.  The second persona is the 
“implied auditor” who is supposed to respond to the rhetor’s appeals.42  If 
the first persona is the “I” of discourse, the second persona  is  the  “‘you’  
of . . . discourse.”43  While the first persona is the assumed “I” and the 
second persona is the assumed “you,” the third persona is “the ‘it’ that is not 
  
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 62. 
 41. Turner & Ryden, supra note 25, at 88-89; Charles E. Morris III, Pink Herring & The Fourth 
Persona: J. Edgar Hoover’s Sex Crime Panic, 88 Q. J. SPEECH 228, 230 (2002).   
 42. Edwin Black, The Second Persona, 56 Q. J. SPEECH 109, 112 (1970). 
 43. Turner & Ryden, supra note 25, at 89. 
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present, that is objectified in a way ‘you’ and ‘I’ are not.”44  This persona 
captures the experience of negation.
45
  Like the second persona, the fourth 
persona functions as an implied auditor of a given ideological position, but a 
key distinction between these two personae is that the discourse that creates 
the fourth persona operates at two levels, the level of those in the know and 
the level of those who do not understand the double entendre.
46
   
As this subsection of the Article has noted, a rhetor can constitute 
various personae in his or her discourse.  A rhetor can select or create a first 
persona, which the rhetor then assumes.  A rhetor even may construct a 
persona for later use, as has been the case when lawyers have constructed 
the persona(e) of the law professor in the United States.  Also, through 
discourse the rhetor can constitute at least three distinct audience-based 
personae, including the second, third, and fourth personae.   
B.  Persona Analysis 
Although not all communication scholars have employed persona 
theory from a rhetorical perspective,
47
 this Article calls upon persona theory 
from such a perspective, specifically to analyze lawyers’ writings on the 
ideal role(s) of the law professor.  Rhetorical scholars have offered some 
discussion of the methodology of persona theory, which several such 
scholars have labeled persona analysis.
48
   
At least two types of persona analysis are possible.  One type of 
analysis is first persona performed (FPP), which considers roles that rhetors 
perform in discourse, while the other type of analysis is first persona 
constructed (FPC), which considers the rhetorical creation of roles that 
rhetors might perform in the future.  Although FPP has been the traditional 
approach taken in rhetorical studies, FPC, which this Article seeks to 
develop, is more appropriate for this study because the present study 
focuses on creation, not performance, of roles.  Here, the interest is in the 
expectations that lawyers have had for the ideal role(s) of the law professor.  
Nonetheless, contrasting FPP analysis with FPC analysis will afford a better 
understanding of FPC analysis, so this subsection of the Article initially will 
  
 44. Philip Wander, The Third Persona: An Ideological Turn in Rhetorical Theory, 35 CENT. 
STATES SPEECH J. 197, 209 (1984). 
 45. Id. at 210. 
 46. Morris, supra note 41, at 230.   
 47. See Kenneth L. Hacker, Walter R. Zakahi, Maury J. Giles, & Shaun McQuitty, Components 
of Candidate Images: Statistical Analysis of the Issue-Persona Dichotomy in the Presidential Campaign 
of 1996, 67 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 227, 232-35 (2000). 
 48. Craig R. Smith, The Persona of Jesus in the Gospel According to St. Matthew, 14 J. COMM. 
& RELIGION 57, 64 (1991); Turner & Ryden, supra note 25, at 90. 
708 OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
review how one might conduct an FPP analysis before the subsection 
reviews how one might conduct an FPC analysis.  
With regard to FPP analysis, B. L. Ware and Wil Linkugel argued that 
the critic who performs the persona analysis should identify a rhetor who 
“represents or symbolizes an historic period, a movement, or world-view.”49  
In other words, the rhetor studied should be significant in one way or 
another.  Examples would be politicians, social activists, and lawyers.  After 
identifying the rhetor, the critic consults relevant artifacts that become the 
objects for study.
50
  Relevant artifacts are the rhetorical texts, such as 
speeches, diary entries, and performances, that a rhetor has constructed. 
After selecting the artifacts, the critic can consult a variety of sources, 
including “the aesthetic realm of literature or myth, or . . . an analogous 
historical episode,” for authority on the persona the rhetor in question 
arguably adopts.
51
  Often, the adopted persona is a cultural archetype, which 
is an original model or prototype upon which later models are based.
52
  
These sources offer the critic a selection of possibilities for potential 
personae, which the critic uses as evidence that the rhetor employed a 
particular persona in the text.  For instance, in their study of Black activist 
Marcus Garvey, Ware and Linkugel consulted the biblical authority Exodus 
for an understanding of the Moses prophet persona, which they then argued 
Garvey had assumed.
53
  If the critic is concerned with the response of the 
specific audience in question, the critic may need to determine whether the 
audience would ascribe to the rhetor the qualities of the given persona.
54
  
This inquiry could be whether a Black audience of the early twentieth 
century would be likely to link a social activist with a prophet persona like 
Moses. 
Regardless of whether the critic is concerned with the audience’s 
ascribing to the rhetor the particulars of a persona, the critic still needs to 
explain how the rhetor calls upon the persona, which gets at the rhetorical 
strategy at hand.
55
  In their study of Garvey, Ware and Linkugel made 
numerous comparisons between Garvey’s circumstances and rhetoric and 
the circumstances and rhetoric of Moses in Exodus, including calls to 
leadership, signs of leadership like drawing large audiences, 
characterizations of people as divinely chosen, and experiences of liberation 
  
 49. Ware & Linkugel, supra note 31, at 62. 
 50. Turner & Ryden, supra note 25, at 90. 
 51. Ware & Linkugel, supra note 31, at 62. 
 52. Id. at 50. 
 53. Id. at 54. 
 54. Id. at 62. 
 55. Id. 
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from captivity.
56
  Ideally, the critic will complete the analysis with an 
explanation of how the assumed persona could impact the rhetorical 
situation.
57
  For example, Ware and Linkugel noted that Garvey‘s rhetoric 
was a factor that helped him assume a position of leadership in the 
movement for Black equality in the United States during the early twentieth 
century.
58
  This was historically important because the death of Booker T. 
Washington in 1915 had left a void in leadership in the Black community.
59
 
With regard to FPC analysis, which is the tool in the present study, a 
slightly different approach is appropriate.  In this study, conducting such an 
analysis involves consideration of law review articles and other legal 
writings about lawyers’ expectations of the ideal law professor role(s) 
produced since 1960.  More details on the sample follow shortly. 
Such consideration involves identification of the various traits for which 
lawyers have argued in their writings on the ideal law professor persona(e) 
and organization of such traits into various categories of personae.  For 
instance, such traits include participating in full-time teaching and research 
or having extensive practical experience in lawyering.  These may be more 
scholarly or more pragmatic in nature.  When considered together, the 
particular characteristics within artifacts offer an outline of a law professor 
persona that certain rhetors have put forth.  Unlike an FPP analysis, an FPC 
analysis may not give the critic the opportunity to rely upon various 
precedents for the persona because the persona is often new.  The 
methodology employed here is similar to content analysis, except that the 
process is based on rhetorical studies rather than social science. 
Unfortunately, research for this Article did not locate any examples of 
FPC studies.  As noted above, critics have focused their energies on 
studying the FPP.  Nonetheless, rhetorical personae have to come from 
somewhere, so at some point in time their construction must have taken 
place.  Accordingly, FPC studies are appropriate, and this Article offers 
such a study. 
The sample for this study comes from a search of the electronic 
database HeinOnline.  HeinOnline contains law review articles that date 
back to the nineteenth century.  For example, the database contains the first 
issue of the American Law Register, which debuted in 1852 and later 
became the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.  Although HeinOnline 
  
 56. Ware & Linkugel, supra note 31, at 55, 58, & 59-61. 
 57. For more on the rhetorical situation, see Lloyd F. Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. & 
RHETORIC 1 (1968).  For a critique of Bitzer’s argument, see Richard E. Vatz, The Myth of the Rhetori-
cal Situation, 6 PHIL. & RHETORIC 154 (1973). 
 58. Ware & Linkugel, supra note 31, at 52-53. 
 59. Id. at 53. 
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does not necessarily contain all law reviews, the database does contain 
hundreds of law reviews, including law reviews at some of the most 
influential law schools.  A key advantage of the database is that, unlike 
databases such as Westlaw and LexisNexis, HeinOnline contains articles 
that date back to the 1960s, the early part of the period covered in the 
current study.  Hence, because it goes back so far, HeinOnline proved to be 
an appropriate database for this particular study. 
The search in HeinOnline identified any law review article since 1960 
that contained the terms law and professor in the title.  Many such articles, 
although not all, would be likely to address the subject of this Article, but 
these articles would not necessarily provide a comprehensive listing of 
relevant articles since the conflict may have appeared in articles that did not 
focus exclusively on the law professor.  To increase the number of 
appropriate articles identified, the search included locating relevant articles 
cited in the footnotes of the articles that resulted from the HeinOnline 
search.  Accordingly, while the texts located for this study are by no means 
all those relevant to the topic, they are both broad in their historical origins 
and not necessarily limited to articles that focused exclusively on the law 
professor. 
Another point relevant to the sample of the articles considered for this 
study is that a review of the articles suggested that the search successfully 
located various key positions in the conflict over the rhetorical construction 
of the law professor persona(e).  When an attorney is attempting to 
determine where the law stands on a particular matter, the attorney conducts 
research until the same main points of law continue to recur within the body 
of research.  Then the attorney can be reasonably confident that he or she 
has located the appropriate law on a given matter.  In the same way, this 
search turned up several recurring perspectives in the discourse on the law 
professor persona(e), including the law professor as scholar and the law 
professor as practitioner.  These perspectives have played out in the conflict, 
but at this point it is important to note that the recurrence of such 
perspectives suggests that the search successfully focused in on a common 
nucleus of operative views in the conflict, even if different advocates may 
have presented the views in slightly different ways. 
III.   ANALYSIS OF THE TEXTS 
Applying persona theory to the texts located for the study, this section 
of the Article examines the various personae that lawyers have created in 
their rhetorics.  Such a discussion focuses on the law professor as scholar 
persona and the law professor as practitioner persona. 
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A.  The Law Professor As Scholar 
The law professor as scholar model has been an important model of the 
law professor persona since 1960, if not well before.  The rhetoric of 
lawyers who have supported this model has offered dimensions of the 
scholar persona that include a full-time dedication to the job, teaching 
duties, production of research, and a public function. 
In constructing this persona, lawyers generally have called upon 
traditional rhetoric, or persuasion,
60
 because the lawyers have been making 
and supporting claims to advance their position.  In adopting traditional 
rhetoric, the lawyers have advanced four main claims: (1) the law professor 
persona should involve devoting almost all professional time to the 
university, (2) the law professor persona should include a teaching 
dimension, (3) the law professor persona should have a research dimension, 
and (4) the law professor persona should include a public function 
dimension.  To develop these major claims that have outlined the scholar 
persona, lawyers have offered various types of evidence.  The following 
discussion examines the arguments that have fleshed out this persona. 
Advocates of the law professor as scholar model have maintained that 
full-time dedication to the job should be an important dimension of the law 
professor persona.  Various aspects of this dimension come from the fact 
that the law professor is a member of the university after perhaps only a 
short tenure in legal practice, if that at all.  As Robert A. Leflar noted, 
following two to five years of private practice or government experience, 
the law professor devotes himself or herself to full-time work in the 
academy, although some outside work may take place on the side, provided 
that work does not “interfere with [the law professor’s] day-to-day 
performance” of working in the university.61  Robert L. Bard of the 
University of Connecticut suggested that the law professor has the status 
that comes with ready access to various individuals such as secretaries and 
research assistants.
62
  Often, access to these people is an indication of full-
time employment within an organization.  Meanwhile, Robert M. Jarvis of 
Nova University noted that the law professor has a good amount of 
available time, and much of that time is open for conducting research.
63
  
This available time is designed to keep the law professor away from “the 
  
 60. See supra, note 5. 
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69, 76 (1988). 
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greater financial rewards offered by private practice.”64  Bard concurred 
with that point.
65
  By making the point, Jarvis was suggesting largely 
separate spheres for lawyers in the academy and for those in the world of 
practice.  In short, because the law school is situated in the university,
66
 the 
law professor tends to be a regular member of the university faculty and 
does not hold other major positions. 
In addition to full-time devotion to the job, advocates of the law 
professor as scholar model have argued that teaching duties should remain 
an important aspect of the law professor=s persona.  Various examples help 
to demonstrate this point.  For instance, lawyers have discussed the 
purposes and methods of law teaching.  Anthony D’Amato of Northwestern 
University argued that teaching law should be about teaching law students 
to cope with legal problems.
67
  Unlike traditional undergraduate lectures 
that tend to do nothing to change a student’s “mental pathways,” the process 
of “[t]eaching [law] is an attempt to change the student’s mind.”68  In this 
sense, the law professor has a duty to try to do more than teach the 
memorization of legal rules; instead he or she needs to enhance the 
student’s thinking skills because not endeavoring to do so would indirectly 
harm “the poor future client who discovers too late that her lawyer is part of 
her problem and not part of her solution.”69  As such, law professors often 
employ the Socratic method of questioning students regarding the materials 
for classes.
70
  D’Amato argued that the questions a professor asks while 
employing the Socratic method should not suggest specific answers; 
instead, the questions should encourage students to develop new ways of 
thinking.
71
 
Lawyers have made other points about law teaching.  Jarvis maintained 
that the law professor should instruct students in the area of legal policy,
72
 
while Roger C. Cramton of Cornell University noted that, because the law 
professor spends most of his or her time teaching large classes of students, 
teaching is a key part of the law professor persona.
73
  Due to law school 
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economics, such large courses may include 100 to 150 students each.
74
  
Regardless, law professors are still supposed to make the classroom 
experience valuable for students. 
More specifically, lawyers have staked out ground on issues relevant to 
the new law professor.  One such lawyer was Susan J. Becker of Cleveland 
State University, who noted that two of these issues include deciding which 
law courses to teach and learning how to teach.
75
  Becker explained that the 
specifics of law teaching consist of items such as self-presentation in front 
of students, choosing course materials, preparation of a syllabus, handling 
the first day of class, and interacting with students.
76
  In terms of interacting 
with students, Becker reflected in the following manner: 
In my brief career, I have faced students who repeatedly arrived ten 
minutes late for class (usually with steaming cup of coffee in hand); 
talked audibly while I or a fellow student had the floor; raised their 
hands in a Pavlovian response every time a question or comment 
danced into their heads; continued to wave the raised hand like a 
first-grader in need of a bathroom pass until I called on them; 
yawned as if they had never been so bored in their entire lives; 
asked questions that had been asked and answered at least twice in 
the previous five minutes; coughed so loudly during class that I 
could not speak over the noise; fell asleep (sitting straight up, no 
less); exhibited the dreaded “So what are you going to do about it?” 
sneer while informing me that they weren’t prepared to discuss the 
assigned material; and even passed a case brief to a student I had 
called on who obviously hadn’t read the assignment.77 
In response to such behaviors, Becker advocated responses like commenting 
on the offending behavior.
78
  Thus, in reply to the yawning student, the 
professor might comment, “‘I’m sorry if we’re boring you; I’ll try to move 
on to something more exciting as soon as possible.’”79  In part because 
lawyers like Becker have reflected on their teaching in this manner, 
teaching has remained an important dimension of the law professor as 
scholar persona. 
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Not only have lawyers embraced the importance of the law professor’s 
relatively traditional teaching duties, but some lawyers have advanced 
alternative ways to teach, including those ways which outsider philosophies 
have informed.  For instance, in critiquing the domineering Kingsfield 
model from the 1970s film The Paper Chase,
80
 Catharine W. Hantzis of the 
University of Southern California offered a feminist perspective on law 
teaching, suggesting that such teaching would benefit from the professor’s 
spending time with students, showing students that the professor cares, and 
finding new experiences for the professor’s students.81  Respectively, these 
suggestions might manifest themselves in a law professor’s having lunch 
with a colleague in the student cafeteria so that the professor is available for 
informal student interaction, breaking large classes into small groups on 
certain days, and perhaps even requiring students in a class on disability law 
to maneuver around the campus in wheelchairs for a few hours.
82
  One goal 
of such an approach to teaching is for the professor to be “both practical and 
student centered.”83 
While full-time dedication to the job and teaching have continued to 
function as notable dimensions of the law professor as scholar model, 
advocates of this persona have argued that research should be a major focus 
of the persona.  Attention given to multiple aspects of scholarship, including 
its justifications, illustrates this point.  For example, Anthony Chase of 
Nova University argued that law professors have had to produce legal 
scholarship because at one time the legal profession chose “to utilize 
universities to control the supply of lawyers in the United States.”84  In 
essence, scholarship produces the dues that law professors owe the 
universities in exchange for the universities’ granting “the socially and 
economically useful premises and auspices of the American university” to 
the legal field.
85
  As members and beneficiaries of the university system, 
law professors have had to play by the rules of publishing or perishing.  
Chase added that, at least during the late 1980s, law professors made more 
money than professors in other academic fields, so law professors had 
another reason for having to pay the publishing dues.
86
 
Jarvis extended the idea that Chase and others have advocated, 
specifically maintaining that scholarship should be “the single most 
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important item on [law professors’] professional agendas.”87  “[O]nly law 
professors have the possibility of becoming and remaining authentic 
academics,” Jarvis asserted.88  For instance, unlike practicing lawyers, law 
professors have flexible professional time, resources for academic research, 
and research assistants.
89
  Jarvis made the point that research should be law 
professors’ top priority not only “the year before they come up for tenure” 
but rather throughout their scholarly careers.
90
  If a lawyer in practice seeks 
to make the transition to the academy, that individual most likely will need 
to publish at least one article to make the case for his or her suitability for 
functioning within the academy.
91
 
In part because many lawyers have designated research as a major 
dimension of the law professor persona, these lawyers have argued over the 
particulars of legal scholarship.  For instance, Cramton considered some of 
the assumptions behind the production of traditional legal scholarship.  
Cramton argued for a “modernist view of tentative and evolving truth” in 
scholarship,
92
 as well as for backing away from advocacy writing.
93
  
Additionally, Cramton bemoaned the point that the prolific scholar would 
gain prestige and move up the ladder of law school hierarchy, regardless of 
the quality of the scholarship he or she produced.
94
  Here, Cramton was 
arguing against a quantity-over-quality approach to advancement in the 
legal academy. 
Meanwhile, during the 1980s, Richard Posner of the University of 
Chicago addressed the various types of scholarship, including doctrinal 
scholarship and interdisciplinary scholarship.
95
  According to Posner, 
doctrinal scholarship is the traditional mode of legal scholarship, 
supposedly free of other disciplines, by which law professors consider legal 
authorities and refine an understanding of what legal doctrine is now and 
should be in the future.
96
  On the other hand, interdisciplinary scholarship 
considers law in light of other scholarly fields such as those in the 
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humanities and social sciences.
97
  Posner concluded that, although doctrinal 
scholarship “should remain the core of legal scholarship,” both types of 
scholarship could have a home within the research dimension of the law 
professor persona and that law schools should attempt to further that end.
98
 
During the subsequent decade, Edward L. Rubin of the University of 
California, Berkeley, concurred with much of Posner’s earlier critique of 
interdisciplinary legal scholarship.  Indeed, Rubin noted the overlap of law 
and other areas of knowledge such as natural science, literary criticism, 
moral philosophy, and social science.
99
  Although he accepted the potential 
value of interdisciplinary scholarship in some cases, Rubin still drew lines 
between legal scholarship and scholarship in other fields.  For instance, he 
argued that while legal scholarship was prescriptive, natural and social 
science scholarship was descriptive, literary criticism was interpretive, and 
moral philosophy was categorically prescriptive.
100
  According to Rubin, 
differing assumptions about methodology proved too much for legal 
scholarship to rely upon the approaches of other fields in most cases.
101
  
Regardless of whether one accepts Rubin’s distinctions among the 
approaches of the non-legal fields that he considered, Rubin’s focus on 
scholarship, much like Posner’s focus, did help advance the notion of the 
importance of the scholarly dimension of the law professor persona because, 
one way or another, the law professor would create scholarship. 
Beyond the considerations of Cramton, Posner, and Rubin, other 
lawyers have argued the specifics of how new law professors should engage 
in legal scholarship, thus again maintaining the belief that the law professor 
persona has a key research dimension.  Robert Abrams of Wayne State 
University offered a few tips, including the need for writing regularly and 
avoiding “[b]usy work” like “[b]ar journal articles, survey pieces, glorified 
op-ed pieces appearing in non-law reviews, law alumni magazine articles, 
previews of U.S. Supreme Court cases, nonsubstantive book reviews, 
segments of commission reports or studies, etc.”102  Abrams urged the new 
law professor to focus on “[h]igher orders” like “[a]ffirmative thesis 
articles, law reform articles, book chapters . . . , frontal attacks on the citadel 
of major legal doctrine, reconciliation of theory with practice articles, [and] 
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longer works such as monographs and books.”103  Sherri L. Burr of the 
University of New Mexico suggested the importance of a scholarly agenda 
of interests and choosing to write from that set of interests.
104
  She 
maintained that “what gives you the most satisfaction” should guide 
selection from the set of interests.
105
 
Abrams also advanced several points about self-motivation for writing 
and the tenure politics that can follow writing.  Addressing self-motivation 
and paraphrasing a colleague, Abrams noted that “the first step in writing is 
to take off your shoes.  Then you crawl under your desk with a hammer and 
nails and nail the shoes to the floor.  Finally, you sit down at the desk, insert 
your feet into the shoes, and tie your shoes on again.”106  In terms of tenure 
politics, Abrams offered “a series of three propositions”: 
1.  Productive writers receive tenure. 
2.  Non-writers are denied tenure. 
3.  In cases not governed by the two primary rules the most 
important determinant in tenure decisions is the quantity of 
credible writing produced by the candidate.
107
 
The sum total of the analysis was the following: “Write early and often!”108 
Other lawyers have reviewed critically some of the purposes of legal 
scholarship.  For example, Robert Stevens of Haverford College questioned 
the audience of legal scholarship.  Stevens queried whether the law 
professor would write academic work that professors in other fields might 
read or pragmatic work that lawyers in the world of practice might use.
109
  
Stevens cautioned that law professors could not be all things to all people.
110
  
Additionally, Marc Rohr of Nova University suggested that some law 
schools might place too much emphasis on scholarship at the cost of law 
students’ educational experiences because not all scholarship benefits 
students.
111
  Nonetheless, by placing great emphasis on the research 
dimension of the law professor persona, lawyers further have emphasized 
their rhetorical construction of the law professor persona as that of a 
scholar. 
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As vital as research has continued to remain as a dimension of the law 
professor as scholar model, advocates of this model have argued that the 
public function dimension is also important, although its importance is not 
as great as that of the research dimension.
112
  This public function 
dimension has several strands, one of which is the development of 
scholarship that is helpful to the world of legal practice.
113
  While such 
scholarship may have “a good dose of theory,” this scholarship should give 
“due weight to doctrine” so as to be of utility to legal practitioners.114  
Roger J. Traynor, an associate justice on the California Supreme Court, 
noted that judges and members of the practicing bar call upon law review 
writing in judicial opinions and briefs to the court.
115
  Naturally, law 
professors are frequently the authors behind law review articles.  As such, 
law professors should offer lawyers in the world of practice views on “how 
the legal regime works” so that lawyers can employ such views while 
working on cases.
116
 
Other strands of the public function dimension of the law professor 
persona likewise involve “devot[ing] a substantial component of [one’s] 
work life to selfless public service.”117  Such additional strands include 
improving social conditions for individuals who are unable to help 
themselves
118
 and offering consultation to government entities.
119
  For 
example, a law professor who teaches torts might offer services to a 
legislative committee that is drafting a major new statute in the area of 
products liability law.  This type of service not only would help legislators 
who would learn from the professor’s expertise and thus be able to produce 
a more effective statute, but the service also could assist consumers who 
may be unaware of the current limitations of state products liability law.  
Besides providing such benefits, participating in this service would set a 
positive example for law students who are on the verge of entering the 
profession.
120
  In a post-Watergate world where the ethos of the legal 
profession has been an ongoing matter of concern, providing such an 
example would be an important benefit.
121
  Finally, the law professor might 
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even take on the occasional high-profile case at the appellate level, 
particularly if the case goes to the U.S. Supreme Court.
122
 
While lawyers rhetorically have constructed a generally uniform scholar 
persona of the law professor, some tension periodically can manifest itself 
among the various dimensions of this persona.  During the 1960s, Thomas 
F. Bergin of the University of Virginia offered an explanation of the tension 
between teaching future lawyers and engaging in scholarship.  Although the 
law professor may teach a favorite jurisprudential seminar, the professor is 
also supposed to teach law students something about the world of practice, a 
process which Bergin called “Hessian-training.”123  Unlike jurisprudential 
teaching, such hands-on teaching often conflicts with the type of research 
that the law professor does.
124
  From this perspective, the tension may be 
impossible to cure.
125
  Clark Byse, formerly of Harvard University and then 
visiting at Boston University, posited that because a law professor’s 
research can inform his or her teaching and vice versa, hands-on teaching 
and research should not be in great tension.
126
  Thus, a law professor ought 
to be able to teach law students something about lawyering and also engage 
in research on the law.  Whether Bergin or Byse made the better point has 
remained an unresolved issue. 
As this Article has illustrated so far, advocates of the law professor as 
scholar persona have argued that the law professor persona should include 
the dimensions of a full-time dedication to the job, teaching duties, 
production of research, and a public function.  Indeed, the scholar persona 
of the law professor has not been oriented heavily in the direction of legal 
practice.   
In presenting their ideal law professor persona as the scholar, lawyers 
who have embraced this position have done so primarily through traditional 
rhetoric.  This rhetoric has involved the advancing and supporting of claims.  
The texts studied here did not suggest any serious consideration on the part 
of the pro-scholar rhetors of competing positions for the purpose of 
understanding those positions.  Indeed, the rhetoric essentially ignored the 
pro-practitioner rhetoric that will receive attention in the next subsection of 
this Article.  
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B.  The Law Professor As Practitioner 
Although the above rhetoric strongly indicates support for the scholar 
persona of the law professor, not all lawyers have accepted this type of 
persona.  Instead, some lawyers have argued vigorously for the merits of a 
practitioner persona, which is experience-based. 
In seeking to construct this alternative persona, lawyers have called 
upon traditional rhetoric because these lawyers have been making and 
supporting claims to advance their position.  Through traditional rhetoric, 
the lawyers have offered two major claims: (1) legal education, via the 
scholar model, has failed to educate future lawyers adequately and (2) the 
practitioner model would be a more effective approach to legal education.  
To support these major claims, pro-practitioner lawyers have offered 
various types of evidence.  This discussion examines the arguments that 
have advanced this practitioner persona. 
Pro-practitioner lawyers have argued passionately that legal education, 
through the scholar model, has failed to train prospective lawyers 
adequately to practice law.  This critique has come from as high up as the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  In the mid-1970s, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger 
took U.S. legal education to task for not satisfactorily training law students 
to function as competent courtroom lawyers.
127
  Calling upon 
“conversations extending over the past twelve to fifteen years at judicial 
meetings and seminars, with literally hundreds of judges and experienced 
lawyers,” Burger estimated that perhaps “from one-third to one-half of the 
lawyers who appear in the serious [legal] cases are not really qualified to 
render fully adequate representation” to clients.128  Burger listed witness 
examination and handling of evidence as examples of skills that many 
lawyers had not mastered.
129
  Analogizing law with other fields, Burger 
pointed out that “[t]he medical profession does not try to teach surgery 
simply with books; more than 80 percent of all medical teaching is done by 
practicing physicians and surgeons.”130   
Burger was not the only individual upset with preparation for legal 
practice.  For instance, Patricia M. Wald, a judge on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, took issue with the research 
performance of the law professor who adopted the scholar persona and how 
that performance did little to prepare students for practical legal writing.  
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For instance, Wald noted that “[a]ble advocacy writing has little in common 
with a long, discursive paper on some abstract facet of the law.”131  Wald 
pointed out that this latter type of writing commonly has a home in “law 
review ‘think’ pieces,”132 which, as noted above, have become a component 
of one of the key dimensions of the scholar persona of the law professor.  
Wald went so far as to explain that her “experience teaches . . . that too few 
law review articles prove helpful in appellate decision making.  They tend 
to be too talky, too unselective in separating the relevant from the irrelevant, 
too exhaustive, too exhausting, too hedged, too cautious about reaching a 
definite conclusion.”133  From Wald’s perspective, the teaching of law 
review writing by professors who have adopted the scholar persona has not 
been in the interest of preparing law students to write as practicing lawyers. 
Away from the bench, Scott Turow, a practicing lawyer in Chicago, 
continued the critique of the efficacy of legal education, claiming, “To put it 
plainly, law school is not lawyer school.”134  Turow argued, “The best 
teachers of legal skills are those who use them, and it would have been 
pointless for my Harvard Law School professors to attempt to instruct me 
about the execution of tasks they themselves may barely know how to 
perform.”135  Indeed, “law school [did] not teach students to think like 
lawyers”; it instead taught students “to think like law professors.”136  
According to Turow, something important was clearly missing from law 
school. 
In light of critiques of law school such as those above and others, 
lawyers have argued that the practitioner model would be a more effective 
approach to legal education than the scholar model.  To address the 
unsatisfactory status quo, Burger maintained that, at least in the case of trial 
practice, “trial advocacy must be learned from trial advocates.”137  U.S. 
legal education could learn from the hands-on approach that England has 
employed in the training of its legal advocates,
138
 and the practitioner 
persona would work well with such an approach.  Ideally, this type of 
approach would help address the level of incompetence that Burger and 
others have described. 
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From her perspective, Wald offered several benefits that law students 
would gain from the law professor who effectively had assumed the 
practitioner persona to teach.  For instance, Wald stressed that law school 
graduates should understand how claims progress through the system so that 
graduates would know whether to litigate a particular claim; not all claims 
can be litigated at acceptable costs, financial or otherwise.
139
  Also, in 
noting the importance of trial experience, Wald quoted her former mentor, 
Judge Jerome Frank, for the point “that focusing on [teaching] appellate 
opinions, to the detriment of [teaching] what happened in the trial court, 
was ‘like the difference between kissing a girl and reading a treatise on 
osculation.’”140  Further, practical experience can allow law graduates to 
understand the human dimensions of legal practice.
141
  As Wald noted, too 
much technical training at the expense of learning how to deal “with real 
clients, witnesses and even judges and court personnel” is detrimental to 
legal practice because lawyers need to know how to interact with other 
human actors in the legal world.
142
  Wald’s argument suggests that the 
appropriate professor to help law students down this path would be the 
professor who could assume the practitioner persona successfully. 
Other individuals on the bench have concurred with the rhetoric of 
Burger and Wald.  Judge Sherman G. Finesilver of the U.S. District Court 
of Colorado argued for the benefits of learning law from professors who 
have adopted the practitioner persona.  Finesilver declared that students 
become more involved in learning from experienced practitioners because 
such practitioners can offer realistic experiences that relate directly to “the 
role of a functioning attorney.”143  Such practical experience should enhance 
the relevance of law school for many law students and better help 
prospective lawyers understand “both the immediate analytic aspects as well 
as the larger social context of each case.”144 
Support for the practitioner persona and its accompanying level of 
expertise has come at the state level as well as at the federal level.  Judge 
Judith Ann Lanzinger, writing while on the Ohio Court of Common Pleas, 
considered the benefits of the law professor’s adopting the persona of a 
practitioner with judicial experience.  Lanzinger argued that, by adding 
“depth and breadth to the law school curriculum,” judges could “enrich the 
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law school itself by balancing faculty who have limited practical 
experience.”145  In particular, such judges might teach trial advocacy classes 
and other litigation-related courses.
146
  If law schools without faculty 
members with judicial experience were to consider employing judges part-
time, the law professor persona would take a turn for the practical, which 
would benefit students.
147
 
Although lawyers in the world of practice have been the dominant 
voices in the call for the practitioner model of the law professor and the 
purported benefits to law students and the legal field that would come with 
such a model, lawyers in the academy have not always avoided such 
rhetoric.  One example was Hugh W. Silverman of the University of 
Windsor, who offered some suggestions that made their way into the U.S. 
conflict over the rhetorical construction of the law professor.  Silverman 
contended that practical experience would allow a law professor to teach 
effectively the overlapping nature of branches of law like contracts and torts 
that frequently come together in practice, much more so than in law school 
classes usually divided up artificially by areas of the law.
148
  Silverman 
explained that “[t]he practitioner who has whetted his teeth upon the various 
skills and arts of the law has a storehouse of knowledge and insight into the 
nature and practice of the law, and can readily assess the needs of the 
lawyer who is about to enter that arena.”149 
Silverman suggested several ways in which the practitioner could bring 
realistic experience to class.  For instance, rather than relying upon 
hypothetical situations to provide instruction, in teaching contracts, the 
practitioner could instruct students in drafting contracts, in teaching torts, 
the practitioner could offer examples from torts trials, and, in teaching civil 
and criminal procedure, the practitioner likewise could present examples 
from experience.
150
  Additionally, because the practitioner with trial 
experience could offer law students a perspective apart from that via which 
students merely would consider appellate law, this alternative approach 
would broaden the education of law students.
151
 
One special situation in which lawyers have argued that the practitioner 
persona of the law professor can be especially helpful in establishing 
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professorial ethos and thus more effective legal education is clinical legal 
education, which goes back at least as far as the 1960s.
152
  Clinical legal 
education involves “integrating the law school with the judicial, legislative 
and administrative processes of a community.”153  Often, the law school 
runs the equivalent of a public interest law firm in which students work on 
real-life legal problems under the supervision of experienced attorneys.
154
 
According to supporters of clinical legal education, the benefits for 
students are many.  For example, Steven H. Leleiko of New York 
University explained that clinical legal education provides direct legal 
experience for law students, offers a different perspective on the law from 
that found in traditional law school classes, opens up students’ minds to 
social change, enhances students’ capacities, allows students to assume 
responsibility in their chosen profession sooner, helps with “a broad range 
of public service activities and the administration of civil and criminal 
justice,” and challenges law students to employ multiple “intellectual 
capacities” simultaneously.155  Naturally, clinical legal education can be 
only as good as the quality of the supervision and the nature of the 
opportunities that law students receive during their clinical experiences.
156
 
For such experiences to have a chance to take place, the professor has to 
assume the persona of a practitioner because the persona of a scholar would 
not fit with the specific means of legal instruction.  This is an example of a 
case in which persona and ethos have a relationship,
157
 as the assumed 
persona of the practitioner would help the professor develop ethos with the 
audience of law students.  If the audience is pragmatically oriented and the 
performance is skillful, the audience’s perception of ethos most likely will 
be positive.  In turn, windows to learning will be more likely to open.  Thus, 
the likely consequences of the professor’s assumed persona include a strong 
professorial ethos and an audience more open to instruction. 
In an attempt to promote at least something of his favored model, Judge 
Edward D. Re, formerly of the U.S. Court of International Trade and then of 
St. John’s University, offered a dose of the practitioner model to 
contemporary legal education.  Reminding law schools that the basic goal of 
legal education should be “to prepare law students for the legal profession,” 
Re argued that the law professor without hands-on legal experience should 
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take a sabbatical to “learn about the daily practice of law, and the practical 
aspects of the trial and appeal of cases.”158  Such a sabbatical should last at 
least a semester but preferably a full school year, and the sabbatical should 
be the professor’s full-time occupation.  The inexperienced law professor 
would acquire hands-on experience and be able to pass on that experience to 
law students and colleagues.
159
  While not fully able to assume the 
practitioner persona, the law professor who assumed the scholar persona 
nonetheless would be able to nod more credibly to the practical part of the 
legal field. 
As the arguments of these lawyers, including the lawyers on the bench, 
show, discontent with the scholar persona of the law professor remains.  
Giving a hearty nod to the practical qualities that they desire in legal 
education, lawyers have advanced a spirited case for the practitioner 
persona to have at least some space within the law school.  Unfortunately 
for these particular lawyers, the rhetoric of individuals like Re concedes that 
the practitioner persona will not be the dominant model within the legal 
academy in the near future.  Still, lawyers have continued to argue for the 
importance of the practitioner model, and the rhetoric of this persona has 
remained defiant. 
In seeking to develop their ideal law professor persona, lawyers who 
have adopted a pro-practitioner position have employed traditional rhetoric.  
This rhetoric has consisted of advancing and supporting claims.  Although 
Re conceded the prominence of the scholar model in contemporary legal 
education, the texts studied here did not suggest serious consideration of the 
pro-scholar position for the purpose of understanding.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has illustrated how the conflict between lawyers who have 
supported the scholar model of the first persona of the law professor and 
lawyers who have supported the practitioner model of the first persona of 
the law professor has continued since 1960.  The fact that many 
compromise perspectives did not emerge from the rhetorical texts located 
indicates that the lines of conflict have been sharp.   
The traditional rhetoric that lawyers generally have employed in the 
period since 1960 has not helped the tension in the field.  Largely without 
listening to the competing view in the conflict, lawyers in academia have 
proceeded to advance their own position.  Perhaps to some observers this 
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approach might appear appropriate because, by virtue of their location 
within the university, these lawyers are currently in the position of power 
regarding decision-making that surrounds the law professor persona(e) and 
may be able to afford communicating in this unilateral manner.  On the 
other hand, lawyers in the world of practice have critiqued the view of 
lawyers in the academy while advancing a very different view of the law 
professor persona.  In this ongoing exercise of either making a case to 
members of one’s own group or making a case to members of one’s own 
group and critiquing the other group’s position, even when that other group 
is not listening, each party has failed to address the other party’s underlying 
concerns. 
One minor refinement to this general observation about traditional 
rhetoric in the conflict is noteworthy because, in the sample of texts studied, 
not quite every line consisted of purely traditional rhetoric.  For example, in 
her discussion of how to address various teaching issues in law school, 
Susan J. Becker offered some personal examples from her own 
classroom,
160
 a strategy more common to non-traditional rhetoric.
161
  On an 
optimistic note, this point leaves open the door for other types of 
communication to enter the conflict, but this rhetorical strategy was not the 
norm. 
In his mid-1980s research, McFarland noted that legal academics and 
practitioners had come to “live in different rhetorical worlds.”162  These 
lawyers had developed “little or no understanding” of each other and had 
become “hostile to one another.”163  While each camp continued to create 
and send out its rhetoric, the other camp did not process that rhetoric 
because the perspectives of the camps were so divergent.
164
  Consequently, 
no one could expect anything more than minor change in the 
communication climate.
165
 
Based on the current study, one now can make essentially the same 
assessment about legal discourse on the U.S. law professor persona(e) from 
1960 to the present time.  In light of the longer study for which McFarland 
called, which the current Article has provided, not only is the 
communication problem as serious as McFarland argued, but the problem 
has persisted in the decades since McFarland conducted his research.  In 
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short, lawyers have talked past each other and clashed with each other, 
making few concessions. 
While McFarland did not offer any major suggestions for improving 
this less than constructive communication,
166
 Francis A. Allen has 
acknowledged that “[d]ialogue concerning the methods and emphasis of law 
training . . . is indispensable to the continuing adaptation of legal education 
to the world in which it finds itself.”167  Indeed, this statement hints at part 
of the underlying problem with the communication in the current conflict.  
Although the camps are disseminating their rhetoric, they often are not 
attempting to listen deeply enough to understand each other, and, if they do 
listen at all, the purpose is to be able to offer a rebuttal.  Either way, 
understanding of underlying concerns like intellectualism and practicality is 
missing.  The traditional approach to the rhetorical process, persuasion, has 
not proved as helpful as one would have liked, but fortunately other 
approaches to rhetoric are available to participants involved in the conflict 
over the rhetorical construction of the law professor persona(e) in the 
United States.  Subsequent research will suggest another approach, 
grounded in contemporary rhetorical theory, that goes beyond rhetoric 
based almost exclusively on persuasion.  At stake are the law professor 
persona(e) and the impact of such persona(e) on legal education and the 
practice of law in, and potentially beyond, the United States. 
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